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Abstract. Wireless Body Area Networks (WBAN) support a variety
of real-time health monitoring and consumer electronics applications.
The latest international standard for WBAN is the IEEE 802.15.6. The
security association in this standard includes four elliptic curve-based
key agreement protocols that are used for generating a master key. In
this paper, we challenge the security of the IEEE 802.15.6 standard by
showing vulnerabilities of those four protocols to several attacks. We
perform a security analysis on the protocols, and show that they all have
security problems, and are vulnerable to different attacks.
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1 Introduction
Advances in wireless communication and embedded computing technologies, such
as wearable and implantable biosensors, have enabled the design, development,
and implementation of Body Area Networks (BAN) [2]. A BAN, also referred to
as a Wireless Body Area Network (WBAN) or a Body Sensor Network (BSN), is a
wireless network of wearable computing devices. BAN devices may be embedded
inside the body (implants), may be mounted on the body (wearable technology),
or may be accompanying devices that humans can carry in clothes pockets, by
hand or in various bags. WBAN can be used for many applications such as
military, ubiquitous health care, sport, and entertainment [2, 3]. WBANs have a
huge potential to revolutionize the future of health care monitoring by diagnosing
many life-threatening diseases, and providing real-time patient monitoring [3].
WBANs may interact with the Internet and other existing wireless technologies.
? Note: A variant of this paper will appear in [1].
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The latest standardization of WBANs is the IEEE 802.15.6 standard [4]
which aims to provide an international standard for low power, short range, and
extremely reliable wireless communication within the surrounding area of the
human body, supporting a vast range of data rates for different applications.
The network topology consists of nodes and hubs. A node is an entity that
contains a Medium Access Control (MAC) sublayer and a physical (PHY) layer,
and optionally provides security services. A hub is an entity that possesses a node’s
functionality, and coordinates the medium access and power management of the
nodes. Nodes can be classified into different groups based on their functionality
(personal devices, sensors, actuators), implementation (implant nodes, body
surface nodes, external nodes) and role (coordinators, end nodes, relays) [3].
Although security is a high priority in most networks, little study has been done
in this area for WBANs. As WBANS are resource-constrained in terms of power,
memory, communication rate and computational capability, security solutions
proposed for other networks may not be applicable to WBANs. Confidentiality,
authentication, integrity, and freshness of data together with availability and
secure management are the security requirements in WBAN [3]. A security
association is a procedure in the IEEE 802.15.6 standard to identify a node and
a hub to each other, to establish a new Master Key (MK) shared between them,
or to activate an existing MK pre-shared between them. The security association
in the IEEE 802.15.6 standard is based on four key agreement protocols that are
presented in the standard [4].
Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) and Password-Authenticated Key Ex-
change (PAKE) protocols aim to exchange a cryptographic session key between
legitimate entities in an authenticated manner. Several security properties must
be satisfied by AKE and PAKE protocols, and they should obviously withstand
well-known attacks. Many protocols have been proposed in the literature, but
some of them have been shown to have security problems [5–7]. It is desirable for
AKE protocols to provide known-key security, forward secrecy, key control, and
resilience to well-known attacks such as Key-Compromise Impersonation (KCI)
and its variants, unknown key-share (UKS), replay, and Denning-Sacco attacks.
PAKE protocols must also be resilient to dictionary attacks [8, 9].
In this paper, we perform a security analysis on four key agreements protocols
that are used in the security association process of the IEEE 802.15.6 standard [4].
We challenge the security of the IEEE 802.15.6 standard by showing vulnerabilities
of those four protocols to several attacks. Excluding vulnerability of the first
Fig. 1. Security hierarchy in IEEE 802.15.6 Standard [4]
protocol to the impersonation attack which has been implied in the standard, no
attack or security vulnerability has been reported in the standard or literature.
All the protocols are available in the latest version of the IEEE 802.15.6 standard.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We review the security structure
of the IEEE 802.15.6 standard in Section 2, these key agreement protocols in
Section 3, and report their security problems in Section 4.
2 Security Structure of the IEEE 802.15.6 standard
The Security hierarchy of the IEEE 802.15.6 standard is depicted in Figure 1. All
nodes and hubs must choose three security levels: unsecured communication (level
0), authentication but no encryption (level 1), and authentication and encryption
(level 2). During the security association process, a node and a hub need to jointly
select a suitable security level. In unicast communication, a pre-shared or a new
MK is activated. A Pairwise Temporal Key (PTK) is then generated that is
used only once per session. In multicast communication, a Group Temporal Key
(GTK) is generated that is shared with the corresponding group [4]. All nodes
and hubs in a WBAN have to go through certain stages at the MAC layer before
data exchange. The security state diagrams of the IEEE 802.15.6 Standard for
secured and unsecured communication are depicted in Figure 2. In a secured
communication, a node can be in one of following states [4]:
– Orphan: The initial state where the node does not have any relationship
with the hub for secured communication. The node should activate a pre-
shared MK or share a new MK with the hub. They cannot proceed to the
Associated state if they fail to activate/establish a shared MK.
– Associated : The node holds a shared MK with the hub for their PTK
creation. The node and hub are allowed to exchange PTK frames with each
other to confirm the possession of a shared MK, create a PTK and transit
Fig. 2. MAC and security state diagrams in IEEE 802.15.6 Standard [4]
to the Secured state. If the MK is invalid/missing during the PTK creation,
they will move back to the Orphan state.
– Secured : The node holds a PTK with the hub. The node and hub can
exchange security disassociation frames, connection assignment secure frames,
connection request and control unsecured frames. The node can exchange
Connection Request and Connection Assignment frames with the hub to
form a connection, and transit to the Connected state.
– Connected : The node holds an assigned Connected NID, a wakeup arrange-
ment, and optionally one or more scheduled and unscheduled allocations with
the hub for abbreviated node addressing, desired wakeup, and optionally
scheduled and unscheduled access. The node and hub are not allowed to send
any unsecured frame to each other, other than unsecured control frames if
authentication of control type frames was not selected during the association.
3 Key Agreement Protocols in the IEEE 802.15.6
Standard
The security association in the 802.15.6 standard involves a Master Key (MK)
which is generated using one of four two-party key agreement protocols, proposed
in the standard. Those four protocols, that will be referred to as protocols I-IV
in this paper, are depicted in Figures 3 to 6. The goal is to establish a new
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MK between a node and a hub. The node and hub are denoted by A and B,
respectively. For simplicity, we have used simpler notations than those of the
standard [4]. We have deleted Immediate Acknowledgement (I-Ack) messages
that B sends to A, after receiving each frame from A. I-Ack is kind of control
type frames, and consists of current allocation slot number (8 bits) and current
allocation slot offset (16 bits). We deleted I-Ack because they are sent in clear. Any
information sent in clear, can be deleted from the security analysis. Protocols I-IV
are similar, but vary in details and requirements. Protocol I is unauthenticated,
and does not have any special requirement. Protocol II requires pre-shared and
out-of-band transfer of a node’s public key to the hub. Then, it is assumed that
a hub obtains a node’s public key via a separate protected channel, and a hub
needs to save public keys of the nodes. Protocol III requires that a node and
hub pre-share a password (PW ). Protocol IV requires that A and B each has a
display that shows a decimal number. It also requires that before accepting a
new MK, human user(s) verify that both displays show the same number.
Protocols I-IV are based on elliptic curve public key cryptography. The domain
parameters consist of an elliptic curve with Weierstrass equation of the form
y2 = x3 + ax + b, defined over the finite field GF (p) where p is a prime number.
In order to make the elliptic curve non-singular, a, b ∈ GF (p) should satisfy
4a3 + 27b2 6= 0. The base point G in the elliptic curve is of order n, where
n×G = O in which O denotes the point at infinity. The IEEE 802.15.6 standard
suggests using the Curve P-256 in FIPS Pub 186-3. Values of a, b, p, n and G are
public, and given in [4].
The private keys shall be 256-bit random integers, chosen independently
from the set of integers {1, ..., n− 1}. The private key of A and B is denoted by
SKA and SKB, respectively. The corresponding public keys are generated as
PKA = (PKAX , PKAY ) = SKA×G and PKB = (PKBX , PKBY ) = SKB×G.
The IEEE 802.15.6 standard does not include having a digital certificate
for public keys. Public keys are self-generated by involved parties, and are not
accompanied by digital certificates. It is because nodes are likely to be severely
resource-constrained, and hence cannot store certificates or perform the certificate
validation. The process of certificate validation consists of verifying the integrity
and authenticity of the certificate by verifying the certificate authority’s signature
on the certificate, verifying that the certificate is not expired, and verifying that
the certificate is not revoked [10].
The standard specifies that the node and the hub will abort execution of the
protocols if the received public key, sent from the other party, is not a valid public
key. A received public key PKi = (PKiX , PKiY ) shall be treated valid only if it
is a non-infinity point (i.e. PKi 6= O) on the defined elliptic curve, i.e. PKiX and
PKiY satisfy the elliptic curve equation given above. This has been explained
in protocol descriptions in the IEEE 802.15.6 standard, but they are absent in
the corresponding figures of the standard. We do not show such verifications in
Figures 3 to 6 either. It is noteworthy that validation of elliptic curve public keys
includes more steps than those mentioned in the standard. In addition to those
conditions, one should check that PKiX and PKiY are properly represented
elements in GF (p), and that n× PKi = O. The last condition is implied by the
other three conditions if the cofactor of the elliptic curve h = 1, which is the case
for curves over prime finite fields [11].
In protocols I-IV, B always sends his public key PKB in clear. In Protocols
I and IV, A sends her public key in clear. In Protocols II, A does not send her
public key, as PKA is pre-shared with B. However, in protocol III, A first sends
a masked public key PK ′A = PKA −Q(PW ) in which PW is a positive integer,
converted from the pre-shared password between A and B. PW is converted
according to the IEEE 1363-2000 standard from the UTE-16BE representation,
specified in ISO/IEC 10646:2003, by treating the leftmost octet as the octet
containing the Most Significant Bits (MSB). The Q(.) function is a mapping
which converts the integer PW to the point Q(PW ) = (QX , QY ) on the elliptic
curve in which QX = 2
32PW +MX where MX is the smallest nonnegative integer
such that QX becomes the X-coordinate of a point on the elliptic curve. QY is
an even positive integer, and is the Y-coordinate of that point. In protocol III, A
shall choose a private key SKA such that the X-coordinate of PKA is not equal
to the X-coordinate of Q(PW ).
CMAC(K,M,L) represents the L-bit output of the Cipher-based Message
Authentication Code (CMAC), applied under key K to message M . The standard
suggests to use CMAC with the AES forward cipher function as specified in the
NIST SP800-38B, and to use a 128-bit key as specified in FIPS197. LMBL(S)
and RMBL(S) designates the L leftmost and the L rightmost bits of the bit
string S, respectively. X(P ) denotes the X-coordinate of point P on the ellip-
tic curve, i.e. X(P ) = X(PX , PY ) = PX . The sign || denotes concatenation
of bit strings that are converted according to the IEEE 1363-2000 standard.
BS2DI(BS) converts the bit string BS to a positive decimal integer for display.
SSS is the Security Suite Selector (16 bits), AC is the Association Control (16
bits), and XX is X0000000000000000. Security Suite Selector specifies type of
cryptographic algorithms and protocols that will be used during the protocol
execution. It consists of the type of security association protocol (3 bits), i.e.
binary representation of the protocol type according to our numbering I-IV, secu-
rity level (2 bits), Control Frame Authentication (1 bit), cipher function (4 bits),
and 6 bits reserved for future uses. Association Control consists of Association
Sequence Number (4 bits), Association Status (4 bits), and 8 bits reserved for
future. SSS is fixed during a protocol execution, but AC will be different for
each message. This is because AC includes the Association Sequence Number
which is increased by one after each frame is sent during a protocol execution.
Excluding I-Ack frames that are deleted from the protocols, there are four paths
between A and B in all protocols.
4 Security Problems
In this section, we show that protocols I-IV are vulnerable to several attacks.
All the protocols are vulnerable to the KCI attack, and they do not provide
the forward secrecy. Furthermore, protocols I, III and IV are vulnerable to the
impersonation attack. Protocol III is also vulnerable to an offline dictionary
attack. Excluding vulnerability of protocol I to the impersonation attack which
has been implied in the standard, no attack has been reported on the protocols,
and they are available in the IEEE 802.15.6 standard.
The impersonation attack is feasible because public keys are self-generated
by involved parties, and they are not accompanied by digital certificates due
to resource constraints in the nodes. Although this is not recommended in the
standard, if one can use certified public keys, or we can have a lightweight PKI
like the scheme proposed in [12], this can prevent the impersonation attacks.
However, all the protocols will still be vulnerable to the KCI attack. The KCI
attack is a variant of the impersonation attack, and has been considered in the
eCK security model [13] for AKE protocols. Resilience to the KCI attack is an
important security attribute for AKE protocols. If the private key of an entity A
is compromised, an adversaryM can impersonate A in one-factor authentication
protocols. However, such compromise should not enable M to impersonate other
honest entities in communication with A. For the sake of briefness, we skip
description of the KCI attack on protocols I, III and IV, because they are already
vulnerable to the impersonation attack which is stronger than the KCI attack.
Forward secrecy is an important security attribute in AKE protocols. If an
entity’s private key has been compromised, it should not affect the security of
session keys that have been established before the compromise. We have also the
notion of Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) which is a bit stronger than the forward
secrecy. PFS means that the established session keys should remain secure even
after compromising the private keys of all the entities that are involved in the
protocol. We have the concept of weak-PFS which only allows a passive attack
after compromise of all involved private keys.
Protocols I-IV use elliptic curve cryptography. Then, it is crucial to have
the public key validation. Upon receiving an ephemeral or static public key, the
recipient entity must validate it. Otherwise, the protocol would be vulnerable to
further attacks. In description of protocols I-IV in the IEEE 802.15.6 standard,
it has been mentioned that public keys should be validated. However, such
validations are absent in corresponding figures in the standard. If one implements
the protocols according to the standard’s figures, and does not consider public key
validations, further security vulnerabilities will arise. There will be extra scenarios
for impersonation attacks on the protocols. Furthermore, all the protocols will
be vulnerable to an invalid-curve attack [14] whereby an attacker can extract the
private key of another entity. We do not consider those extra vulnerabilities, and
strongly recommend to validate public keys.
In the rest of this paper, E denotes the adversary in a passive attack, and M
denotes the adversary in an active attack. The order of protocols and attacks
does not imply any preference or importance. The numbering is according to the
standard, and will be included in the SSS during protocol executions.
4.1 Protocol I
Protocol I is an unauthenticated key exchange protocol. It is trivially vulnerable
to an impersonation attack, but we consider it just for completeness of our
security analysis. Such vulnerability has been implied in the standard only for
this protocol, where the protocol is introduced as a protocol “without the benefit
of keeping third parties from launching impersonation attacks” [4]. Protocol I
does not provide the forward secrecy.
Impersonation attack: Here is an impersonation attack on protocol I, in which
M impersonates A:
- M selects a private key SKM , and generates the corresponding public key as
PKM = (PKMX , PKMY ) = SKM ×G.M selects a 128-bit random number
NM , and sends {IDB ||IDA||SSS||AC||NM ||PKMX ||PKMY ||XX} to B.
- B selects a 128-bit random number NB , and sends {IDA||IDB ||SSS||AC||NB
||PKBX ||PKBY ||XX} to M.
- B computes DHKey = X(SKB × PKM ), T ′1 = RMB128(DHKey), T ′2 =
CMAC(T ′1, IDA||IDB ||NM ||NB ||SSS, 64), and T ′3 = CMAC(T ′1, IDB ||IDA
||NB ||NM ||SSS, 64). B sends {IDA||IDB ||SSS||AC||NB ||PKBX ||PKBY ||T ′2}
to M.
- M computes DHKey = X(SKM × PKB), T1 = RMB128(DHKey), T2 =
CMAC(T1, IDA||IDB ||NM ||NB ||SSS, 64), and T3 = CMAC(T1, IDB ||IDA
||NB ||NM ||SSS, 64). M sends {IDB ||IDA||SSS||AC||NM ||PKMX ||PKMY
||T3} to B. M computes T4 = LMB128(DHKey), and generates the master
key MK = CMAC(T4, NM ||NB , 128).
- B verifies that T3 = T ′3, computes T ′4 = LMB128(DHKey), and generates the
master key MK = CMAC(T ′4, NM ||NB , 128).
M and B reach to the same MK at the end.M could successfully impersonate
A. A similar scenario for an impersonation attack can be written where M
impersonates B in communication with A.
Lack of Forward Secrecy: Here we show that Protocol I does not provide the
forward secrecy, and then does not provide the weak-PFS or PFS:
- Assume that SKB has been compromised. E , that has eavesdropped and saved
all the messages exchanged through previous runs of the protocol, knows PKA,
NA and NB . E computes DHKey = X(SKB×PKA), T ′4 = LMB128(DHKey),
and obtains the established key MK = CMAC(T ′4, NA||NB , 128).
- If SKA has been compromised, E computes DHKey = X(SKA × PKB),
T4 = LMB128(DHKey), and obtains MK = CMAC(T4, NA||NB , 128).
4.2 Protocol II
Protocol II requires out-of-bank transfer of a node’s public key to the hub. It is
vulnerable to the KCI attack, and lacks the forward secrecy.
Key Compromise Impersonation attack: Protocol II is vulnerable to the
KCI attack. Here is the attack scenario in which M has SKA and impersonates
B. As the public key of B is sent in clear, we can assume that M has obtained
PKB by eavesdropping a previous protocol run.
- A selects a 128-bit random number NA, and sends {IDB ||IDA||SSS||AC||NA
||0||0||XX} to B. M hijacks the session, and tries to impersonate B.
- M selects a 128-bit random number NM , and sends {IDA||IDB ||SSS||AC||NM
||PKBX ||PKBY ||XX} to A.
- M has SKA.M computes DHKey = X(SKA×PKB), T ′1 = RMB128(DHKey),
T ′2 = CMAC(T
′
1, IDA||IDB ||NA||NM ||SSS, 64), and T ′3 = CMAC(T ′1, IDB ||
IDA||NM ||NA||SSS, 64).M sends {IDA||IDB ||SSS||AC||NM ||PKBX ||PKBY
||T ′2} to A.
- A computes DHKey = X(SKA × PKB), T1 = RMB128(DHKey), and
T2 = CMAC(T1, IDA||IDB ||NA||NM ||SSS, 64). A verifies that T2 = T ′2,
and computes T3 = CMAC(T1, IDB ||IDA||NM ||NA||SSS, 64). A sends
{IDB ||IDA||SSS||AC||NA||0||0||T3} to M.
- A computes T4 = LMB128(DHKey), and generates the master key MK =
CMAC(T4, NA||NM , 128).
- M computes T ′4 = LMB128(DHKey), and generates the master key MK =
CMAC(T ′4, NA||NM , 128).
M and A compute the same MK. M could successfully impersonate B.
Lack of Forward Secrecy: Protocol II does not provide the forward secrecy.
As it is assumed that PKA has been securely shared with B, we just consider the
case that SKA has been compromised. We show how E can extract previously
established MK from the eavesdropped messages which proves lack of forward
secrecy and PFS: As PKB, NA and NB are sent in clear, we can assume that
they are eavesdropped and saved by E . E computes DHKey = X(SKA × PKB),
T4 = LMB128(DHKey), and obtains MK = CMAC(T4, NA||NB , 128).
4.3 Protocol III
Protocol III is a PAKE protocol. It is vulnerable to impersonation and offline
dictionary attacks. It does not provide the forward secrecy.
Impersonation attack: For performing an impersonation attack to Protocol
III, M first eavesdrops messages between A and B in a protocol run. M then
obtains PK ′A and PKA from messages (1) and (4) of the protocol. M computes
Q′ = PKA − PK ′A, and uses Q′ for an impersonation attack. Note that we have
Q′ = Q(PW ). Here is an impersonation attack on protocol III, in which M
impersonates A:
- M selects a private key SKM , and generates the corresponding public key as
PKM = (PKMX , PKMY ) = SKM ×G. M computes PK ′M = PKM −Q′.
If PK ′M = O, M selects a new private and public key and continues the
process until PK ′M 6= O.M selects a 128-bit random number NM , and sends
{IDB ||IDA||SSS||AC||NM ||PK ′MX ||PK ′MY ||XX} to B.
- B selects a 128-bit random number NB , and sends {IDA||IDB ||SSS||AC||NB
||PKBX ||PKBY ||XX} to M.
- B calculates PKM = PK ′M + Q(PW ), and computes DHKey = X(SKB ×
PKM ), T
′
1 = RMB128(DHKey), T
′
2 = CMAC(T
′
1, IDA||IDB ||NM ||NB ||SSS,
64), and T ′3 = CMAC(T
′
1, IDB ||IDA||NB ||NM ||SSS, 64). B sends {IDA||IDB
||SSS||AC||NB ||PKBX ||PKBY ||T ′2} to M.
- M computes DHKey = X(SKM × PKB), T1 = RMB128(DHKey), T2 =
CMAC(T1, IDA||IDB ||NM ||NB ||SSS, 64), and T3 = CMAC(T1, IDB ||IDA
||NB ||NM ||SSS, 64). M sends {IDB ||IDA||SSS||AC||NM ||PKMX ||PKMY
||T3} to B. M computes T4 = LMB128(DHKey), and generates the master
key MK = CMAC(T4, NM ||NB , 128).
- B verifies that T3 = T ′3, computes T ′4 = LMB128(DHKey), and generates the
master key MK = CMAC(T ′4, NM ||NB , 128).
M and B reach to the same MK at the end.M could successfully impersonate
A. A similar scenario for an impersonation attack can be written where M
impersonates B in communication with A.
Offline Dictionary attack: Protocol III is a PAKE protocol with two-factor
authentication. It requires both public keys and a shared password. For PAKE
protocols, it is crucial to provide resilience to offline dictionary attacks. If an
adversary could guess a password, he should not be able to verify his guess
offline. For performing a dictionary attack on protocol III, it is sufficient that E
eavesdrops messages between A and B in a protocol run. E then obtains PK ′A
and PKA from messages (1) and (4) of the protocol. E computes PKA−PK ′A =
Q(PW ) = (QX , QY ). As QX = 2
32PW + MX and QX is known, this can be
used as a verifier. E can then try probable passwords from a dictionary of most
probable passwords, and check which password PW will map to QX . This can
be done very fast, and E can find the password PW that is shared between A
and B.
Lack of Forward Secrecy: Protocol III does not provide the forward secrecy. As
PKB , NA and NB are sent in clear, we can assume that they are eavesdropped and
saved by E . If SKA is compromised, E computes DHKey = X(SKA×PKB), T4 =
LMB128(DHKey), and obtains the master key MK = CMAC(T4, NA||NB , 128).
4.4 Protocol IV
Protocol IV is vulnerable to an impersonation attack, and lacks the forward
secrecy.
Impersonation attack: Here is an impersonation attack on protocol IV, in
which M impersonates A:
- M selects a private key SKM , and generates the corresponding public key as
PKM = (PKMX , PKMY ) = SKM ×G.M selects a 128-bit random number
NM , and computes WM = CMAC(NM , IDA||IDB ||PKMX ||PKMY , 128).
M sends {IDB ||IDA||SSS||AC||WM ||PKMX ||PKMY ||XX} to B.
- B selects a 128-bit random number NB , and sends {IDA||IDB ||SSS||AC||NB
||PKBX ||PKBY ||XX} to M.
- B computes DHKey = X(SKB × PKM ), T ′1 = RMB128(DHKey), T ′2 =
CMAC(T ′1, IDA||IDB ||WM ||NB ||SSS, 64), and T ′3 = CMAC(T ′1, IDB ||IDA
||NB ||WM ||SSS, 64). B sends {IDA||IDB ||SSS||AC||NB ||PKBX ||PKBY ||T ′2}
to M.
- M computes DHKey = X(SKM × PKB), T1 = RMB128(DHKey), T2 =
CMAC(T1, IDA||IDB ||WM ||NB ||SSS, 64), and T3 = CMAC(T1, IDB ||IDA
||NB ||WM ||SSS, 64).M sends {IDB ||IDA||SSS||AC||NM ||PKMX ||PKMY
||T3} to B.
- DisplayM will show BS2DI(D) in which D = CMAC(NM ||NB , NB ||NM ||T1, 16).
- B verifies that T3 = T ′3, computes W ′M = CMAC(NM , IDA||IDB ||PKMX ||
PKMY , 128), and verifies that WM = W
′
M . DisplayB will show BS2DI(D
′)
where D′ = CMAC(NM ||NB , NB ||NM ||T1, 16).
- As DisplayM = DisplayB , B computes T ′4 = LMB128(DHKey) and MK =
CMAC(T ′4, NM ||NB , 128).M computes T4 = LMB128(DHKey) and MK =
CMAC(T4, NM ||NB , 128).
M and B compute the same MK. M could successfully impersonate A. A
similar scenario can be written for an impersonation attack whereM impersonates
B in communication with A.
Lack of Forward Secrecy: Protocol IV does not provide the forward secrecy.
As PKA, PKB, NA and NB are sent in clear, we can assume that they are
eavesdropped and saved by E .
- If SKB has been compromised, E computes DHKey = X(SKB × PKA),
T ′4 = LMB128(DHKey), and obtains MK = CMAC(T
′
4, NA||NB , 128).
- If SKA has been compromised, E computes DHKey = X(SKA × PKB),
T4 = LMB128(DHKey), and obtains MK = CMAC(T4, NA||NB , 128).
5 Conclusion
The security of the IEEE 802.15.6 standard for WBAN [4] has been challenged in
this paper. We analyzed the security of four key agreement protocols that are used
for establishing a master key in the security association process of the standard.
We showed that all four protocols have security problems. They are vulnerable to
the KCI attack, and lack the forward secrecy. Furthermore, the first, third and
fourth protocols are vulnerable to the impersonation attack. The third protocol
is also vulnerable to the offline dictionary attack. Further attacks will be feasible
if public keys are not validated. The standard aims to provide the confidentiality,
authentication, integrity, privacy protection and replay defence. We could not
find any indication that the security mechanisms in the standard provide privacy.
However, our attacks show that the confidentiality and authentication are not
achieved by the current security mechanisms in the standard.
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